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Risk Exposure and Management in
Cross-Border Banking
Sheriffdeen A. Tella*

I.

Introduction

I

n the last fifteen years or so, many financial regulators have been developing
'Risk-Based' approaches to regulations and supervision. This is an outcome
of the second wave of crises arising from failures of financial institutions in
the mid-1990s and because of the increasingly competitive environment within
which financial institutions operate or transact their businesses. The operating
environment is becoming risky and needs serious monitoring to avoid catastrophe
to the economy. The operational risk may arise from fraud, error, inability to
deliver services, maintaining a competitive position or management of
information. These operational risks may affect other risks such as credit, interest
rates, compliance with regulations, liquidity, price, strategic or reputation.
The need for Risk-Based supervision is anchored on some inadequacies noticed in
existing supervision framework to tackle new challenges within the context of
globalization or internationalization of finance. Thus, the risk-based framework
is usually based on emerging international standards and good practices in
developed countries.
Another development in economic management among monetary authorities,
which started in developed countries and now being adopted by some developing
*Professor Tel/a is from the Departme/11 of Economics, Olabisi 011abanjo University Ago-lwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.
E-mail: sare/lang@yahoo.com; satellang@ooufms.com. The views expressed in the paper are entirely those ofthe author and
should not in any way be ascribed to the CBN or its management.
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countries is inflation targeting framework. Inflation targeting is a framework for
keeping inflation at low level in an economy. It is akin to maintaining price
stability in macroeconomic parlance.
Whether there is a policy to adopt inflation targeting framework or not, all
economic managers propose to achieve macroeconomic objectives of full
employment of resources, economic growth, price stability, balance of payments
equilibrium and income redistribution.
Price stability or maintenance of low and stable sustainable inflation levels is
central to achieving some of the other objectives.
The title of this paper connotes the fact that risk-based supervision and inflation
targeting are mutually inclusive policies that have to be carried out
simultaneously. This is not true. The two frameworks can be adopted at the same
time but they do not need to go pari passu. To that extent the paper can be regarded
as two-in-one. In this connection, the two frameworks are treated separately but
within the context ofa single paper. We looked at their challenges and prospects in
monetary policy formulation and implementation in the Nigerian economy.
The rest of this paper is divided into four major sub-sections. The next section
deals with issues in Risk-Based Supervision framework and this is followed in
Section 3 by issues in Inflation Targeting Framework. In Section 4, we look at the
challenges and prospects of adopting the two frameworks in monetary policy
while the summary and conclusion are contained in Section 5.
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II.
Risk-Based Supervision Framework
11.1. Motivation and Rationale
The word 'Risk' is usually used to describe a form ofuncertainty. Where the actual
outcome of an action is not known, it is expected that it will be determined as a
result of random drawing from a set of possible actions whose distribution is
known. The variance of possible outcomes is frequently used as a measure of risk
(Black, 2002). Risk-based supervision, therefore, connotes a situation whereby
the regulator of a system is expected to be in a state of anticipation and proactively
take steps to eliminate or at least, minimize the cost of an anticipated event or
occurrence.
The Risk-Based Supervision framework (RBSF) for the financial system is all
embracing. That is, it is not limited to the banking sub-sector but extends to nonbank financial institutions and even the technology used in the system. Thus, we
have such titles as 'Risk-Based Capital Framework for Insurance Business', 'RiskBased Supervision of Pension Funds', 'Risk-Based supervision of Technology
2
Service Providers', and, 'Risk-Based Regulation in Financial Services' which is
related more to the banking sector than any other areas of the financial system.
Each of these has its own peculiarities but we concentrate on the Risk-Based
Regulation in Financial Services.
A number of reasons were adduced as the basis for developing risk-based
supervision and these include the need to:
• bring supervisory practices in line with developments in financial
institutions' operations and risk management practices;
• create new organizational culture within the recently formed regulatory

body;
'The Research Report on "The Development of Risk-Based Regulation in Financial Services: Canada, the UK and
Australia " by Black (2004) assisted a lot i11 providing some background infom,ation i11 this Section.
'See.for example, Graeme Thomson (2008), Black, (2004), Monetary Authority of Singapore (2003).
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deliver 'integrated' financial regulation;
improve internal managerial control, to prioritize resources and shift
regulation onto a more proactive footing (Black, 2004).

In addition to the above, Black (2004) posits that political pressure following
financial collapses, and concern to manage the expectations ofpoliticians and the
wider public on what regulation could and should achieve, are part of the
motivations for the risk-based supervision.
The RBSF is geared towards giving the monetary authority powers to be more
interventionist and proactive in safeguarding the financial institutions. This will
sustain public confidence in the financial system, protect deposits and policy
holders, as well as ensure that financial institutions generally are in sound
conditions. The framework will, therefore, require additional legal framework to
empower the monetary authority to take necessary actions within the context of
the risk-based supervision. The legal framework could be in the form of a guide to
intervention. The framework makes the operations of the financial institutions to
be more transparent and accountable.
The general adoption of information communication technology (ICT) in
financial institutions further makes the adoption of risk-based supervision
framework more imperative. This is because there are underlying risk issues that
are common to all ICT activities. Such risk issues include:
•
Management ofTechnology the planning and overseeing of technological
resources and services so as to ensure that they support the strategic goals
and objectives of the financial institution;
•
Integrity of data the accuracy and reliability of automated information
provided and associated information system;
•
Confidentiality of information the protection of information from both
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intentional and unintended disclosure to unauthorized persons;
Availability of services
the effectiveness of business continuity
programmes and adherence to service-level agreements.

II.2. Approaches and Central Elements ofRBSF
Comparing the risk-based frameworks for Canada, the United Kingdom and
Australia, Black (2004) affirms that the frameworks share the same basic
approach and central elements. The approaches are to identify and assess the risks
to the regulator's objectives that are posed by the financial firms being regulated,
and, to address those using the various regulatory tools that they possess. The
central elements are:
• The identification of two main categories of firm-specific risks i.e.
inherent risk arising in the business itself and the risks arising in the
management and control of those inherent risks by the financial institution
itself;
• Risk assessment and ranking;
• Communication of final result, but not the details of the assessment,
directly to the chief executive and/or board members;
• Duties on firms not to disclose the risk ranking; and
• Linking ofsupervisory response to the risk ranking.
The criteria for assessing risks have to be developed, by the regulator, as part of
the package of the framework and these can take different forms. So also is the
formula and methods used for arriving at a final risk score for an institution.
Supervisory assessment techniques used in the banking industry include
universal licensing, 'fitness and propriety' assessment and risk management
requirements.
Universal licensing implies that all banks must be licensed, registered and
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regulated by the regulatory authority with respect to all aspects of supervision
based on a legal framework. Financial institutions need to satisfy both fitness and
propriety at licensing as well as meet these requirements on an on-going basis. On
the basis of fitness, the regulator can mandate minimum requirement for skill,
education or experience, basic understanding of key regulatory requirements,
including their duties and responsibilities. The institutions must also develop their
own policies in line with acceptable standards of fitness and propriety, taking
account of the size and complexity of their operations.
The Risk Management Standard implies that the financial institutions must have
policies and procedures to identify, measure and manage all material risks. These
policies and procedures, which must be submitted to the regulatory authority,
must be supported by a formal methodology and be clearly documented. Albeit,
the regulator is expected to provide guidelines on risk management so that the
institutions could present well-structured process to identify and assess risks.

III. Inflation Targeting Framework (ITF)3
ID.I ITF:WhatitisandWhatitisnot?
The case for inflation targeting as a monetary framework is hinged on the premise
that the main goal of monetary policy is the achievement and preservation of low
and stable rate of inflation. Inflation targeting started with New Zealand in early
1990s and was later adopted by Canada, United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland,
Australia and Spain before the end of the decade. Some of the developing
countries that have since adopted the framework are Indonesia, Isreal, Korea,
Mexico, Thailand and SouthAfrica.
Economists were initially skeptical about the inflation targeting framework but

' This section benefits greatly f rom Masson, et. Al., 1998
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over time and based on some principles, some of them have come to accept the
framework as improving the performance of monetary policy in terms of its
design and implementation. Even though there is no strong theoretical
justification that the framework possesses superior welfare properties to any other
framework, a growing number of central banks seem to be adopting it. Inflation
targeting calls for the explicit acknowledgement that low and stable inflation is
the overriding goal ofmonetary policy, implying that a low inflation target should
4
have supremacy over other development objectives. However, Mishkin (2000)
who is an advocate of inflation targeting, acknowledges that price stability is "a
means to an end, a healthy economy and should not be treated as an end in itself'
and that "central bankers should not be obsessed with inflation control".
Inflation targeting is not accepted by all as an indispensable framework for
achieving macroeconomic goals. Those who criticise it do argue that it is a
straight-jacket framework which induces pro-cyclical monetary policy
particularly in the presence of supply-side shocks, but, supply side shocks always
pose difficulties for monetary policy generally. There exists strict and flexible
inflation targeting. Strict inflation targeting or what Governor Mervyn King of the
Bank of England referred to as "inflation nutters", is when the central bank does
not give any consideration to short-term output fluctuaion in the conduct of
monetary policy. In the case of flexible inflation targeting, output costs of
monetary policy actions is factored into the decision making process (Mboweni,
2008).
The advantage of an inflation targeting framework is that it provides an anchor for
inflation expectations, as it makes monetary policy goal very clear before the
public. The public must be informed of the target and this is very significant

'Cited in Packard, 2007.
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because it also binds the politician in terms of consideration and approval of
spending or expenditure in the national budgets. The more anchored expectations
are, the more flexible the conduct of monetary policy to respond to exogenous
shocks.

ID.2 Basic Premises and Prerequisites
The following four basic propositions form the basic premises upon which
inflation targeting rests:

•

•
•

•

An increase in money supply is neutral in the medium-to-long run .
That is, money supply increases by the monetary authority will
have no effect on output or employment but only on prices.
High and variable inflation is costly, in terms of resource allocation
and long run growth in output.
Money is not neutral in the short run such that monetary policy has
important transitory effects on a number of real variables,
including output and employment. However, there is still no
consensus on the nature and size of the effects, the time frame and
the means by which monetary impulses are communicated to the
rest of the economy.
Monetary policy affects the rate of inflation with lags of uncertain
duration and varying strength. These lags make it difficult and
probably impossible for the central bank to control inflation on a
period-by-period basis (Masson, et. al. 1998).

If a country is to be successful with inflation targeting framework, the central
bank must first, as a precondition, have considerable degree of freedom even
though it may not have full legal independence. The Bank must have the freedom
to use the instruments of monetary policy to effect some nominal objectives. In
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this circumstance, monetary policy should not be fiscal policy driven or
constrained. That is, government borrowing from the central bank must be very
low or non-existent.
Other conditions to be fulfilled within this context are that government should
have a broad revenue base and place less reliance on seigniorage generated by
excessive currency issuance; domestic financial markets should be developed
with enough depth to absorb the placement ofprivate and public debt instruments,
and the accumulation of public debt should be sustainable. Large or protracted
fiscal imbalances will result in inflationary pressure that will undermine the
efficacy of monetary policy in achieving any nominal target and force the
monetary authorities to follow accommodative monetary policy at high rate of
inflation.
The second precondition is that the central bank should refrain from targeting the
level or path of any other nominal variable such as wages and nominal exchange
rate. This implies that the country is exchange rate regime should allow for
flexibility. Either the country runs flexible exchange rate regime or crawling peg
that allows the market to play its role. In this case, the central bank is not bothered
about such variables but concentrates on inflation targeting and gives it priority
whenever conflict arises.
When a country is able to satisfy these two basic requirements, it would be able to
conduct its monetary policy in such a way that inflation targeting framework
should work for the economy. However, the monetary authorities would need to
set up a monetary policy framework with the following essential elements:

•
•

•
'

Explicit inflation targets for some period or periods ahead;
Clear and unambiguous indications that attaining those inflation
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targets is the overriding objective of monetary policy;
A model for forecasting inflation that uses relevant variables and
information indicators; and
A forward-looking operating procedures in which the setting of
policy instruments depends on assessing inflationary pressures and
where inflation forecasts are used as the main intermediate target of
monetary policy (Masson et. al., 1998).

It is imperative for the monetary authorities to have technical and institutional
ability, and the will to model and forecast domestic inflation. The use of the
monetary instruments should be flexible enough to impact on variables affecting
inflation now and in future, and the central bank should have a view on the way
monetary impulses affect the main macroeconomic variables.

ID.3. Inflation Targeting: Conditions in Developed and Developing
Countries
Masson et.al. (1998) noted that the industrial countries that adopted ITF share a
number of features which make the framework to work for them. These features
are:
•
ITF has always been associated with a high degree of exchange rate
flexibility.
•
All the countries that have adopted the framework have a measure
of central bank independence with considerable freedom in setting
monetary policy instruments and a minimal burden of financing
government budgets.
•
They all use short-term interest rates as their main operating
instrument and rely on well-developed financial markets to alter
longer-term rates and transmit the effects of those changes to
aggregate demand and inflation.
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The inflation targets set are all forward looking as they represent a
promise to offset the foreseeable deviations of future inflation from
the pre-specified targets over a period of one to two years.
All the countries use ITF as a tool to build the credibility of the
general framework of macroeconomic policy. In this circumstance,
there would have been some agreement between monetary and
fiscal authorities on the inflation targets to avoid conflicting policy

•

stance.
Most important, ITF has been introduced only when the rate of
inflation was already less than 10 percent such that announcing a
lower inflation target would not be perceived by the public as

superfluous.
The conditions in developing countries are regarded as markedly different from
those stated above. Studies of central bank independence in developing countries
showed that their monetary authorities face environments radically different from
their counterparts in the developed countries. The scope for central banks in
developing countries to conduct an independent monetary policy is hampered by
(i) heavy reliance on seigniorage; (ii) shallow financial markets characterized by
interest rates repression, high reserve requirements, sectoral credit policies and
compulsory placements of public debt; and (iii) fragile banking system (Masson
et. al., 1997).

In addition to the above, monetary policy efficacy in developing countries is
constrained by a number of other factors. These include dominance of currency in
money holding by the non-bank public for transactionary purpose, which results
in high level of liquidity outside the banking system; limited array of financial
instruments to be traded in the money market; underdeveloped capital market;
and the long lag in the effect of monetary policy as a result of some structural
difficulties.
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Challenges and Prospects of Risk-Based Supervision and Inflation
Targeting In Nigeria

IV.I. Challenges and Prospects of Risk-Based Supervision

The challenges of risk-based supervision can be gleaned from the motivations for
developing the framework as identified in section 2.1 above and developing some
criteria for assessing risks as well as choosing the right formula and methods for
arriving at a final risk scores for an institution. As a recapitulation, the motivations
include political pressure following financial collapse, the need to bring
supervisory practices in line with developments in financial institutions'
operation and risk management practices, the need to deliver 'integrated' financial
regulation, and the need to shift regulation to a more proactive status.
It is important to determine whether these motivations for the adoption of the
RBSF exist presently in the Nigerian environment. More than any other time, the
current global financial crisis in developed countries and its attendant bandwagon
effects on some of the financial markets in developing countries, serves as enough
justification to adopt RBS framework in countries that have not done so.
However, we may want to ask whether the countries that are hard hit by the global
financial crisis, such as the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and other
5
European countries, have not adopted the framework? If they have and we
believe the framework makes financial operations transparent, then what went
wrong? And does the framework worth the efforts put into it? The alternative
question would be: what would have been the extent and depth ofthe crisis if they
have not adopted risk-based supervision framework? The implication is that the
framework is not foolproof.
W't nolt that United Kingdom iJ one ef the ro11nlrnl RBSF ll1aJ ammd l!J Black (2004).
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Sequel to the recent banking consolidation exercise of the Central Bank ofNigeria
and eventual implementation of the directive, the number of deposit money banks
in Nigeria reduced from 89 to only 25 universal banks and later to 24 banks with
the merger of Stanbic and IBTC Chattered Banks. This action, theoretically,
should reduce competition relative to when there were many banks serving the
same market. The reality has shown that competition became more profound after
the banking consolidation than before. Banks now have to take more risks in order
to control sizeable part ofthe market.
For the first time, more banks are engaged in off-shore banking.
Internationalization or globalization of finance is growing at the unexpected
speed of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), resulting in greater
risks, particularly for financial institutions that are just facing the challenges of
the complexity of global finance! Such situations do not require business-as-usual
supervision; rather, risk-based supervision becomes the only alternative as it
helps deliver 'integrated' financial regulations and best practices in operations and
risk management.
Another challenge, which is part ofthe motivation, is the political pressure arising
from the current global financial crisis. Both operators in the financial markets
and the non-bank public, in particular the business class and the politicians, are
apprehensive that the financial collapse in many developed countries could
reverberate, sooner than later, in our fragile financial system. The monetary
authorities and financial regulators must, therefore, be seen to be proactive in
dealing with financial institutions. This is one of the primary objectives ofRBSF.
Additional challenge for the financial regulators is whether there is availability of
skilled manpower to formulate and implement risk-based supervision for the
financial system. There is the need to set up criteria for assessment, develop
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formula, techniques and methods for assessing the institutions. The fmancial
institutions staff too must be trained in the art and science ofRBSF requirements
and the legal framework must be developed. The framework, if adopted, will be a
new foray in the history of banking in Nigeria and as such will require special
training for all that will be involved.
Given the above operating environment for the financial system and the local as
well as the international economies, the prospect for adopting RBS framework in
Nigeria cannot be underestimated. Fortunately, there is a reservoir of experienced
and highly skilled manpower in the regulatory sector of the financial industry.
These personnel will require little training period to catch up with the
requirements ofRBSF. They can then serve, along with Department of Banking
and Finance in some higher institutions, as the nucleus of teachers and trainers for
the entire financial industry.
There are a crop of legal personnel, locally and internationally, who specialize in
commercial law and who can be used to provide the legal framework for
executing the project. These will then be scrutinized by the appropriate
committees of the House of Representative and Senate to give legal backing for
the new procedure for supervising the fmancial system.
IV.2. Challenges and Prospects oflnflation Targeting Framework
The challenges facing successful execution of ITF within the context of the
preconditions and other constraints require critical examination. First, since the
enthronement of democratic governance, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has
been enjoying relatively higher degree of freedom than hitherto in its conduct of
monetary policy and has also strengthened the use of market instruments, since
after the introduction of structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1986. That is,
the CBN has overcome the challenge of the first precondition as well as reliance
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on use of direct monetary tool to achieve its monetary policy goals. On the second
precondition, Nigeria operates flexible exchange rate and does not require serious
intervention by the Central Bank while the issues of wages is kept within the
purview of the fiscal policy.
The depth of the financial market is often measured by the difference between the
nominal lending and saving rates or ratio of broad money (M2) or domestic credit
to the gross domestic product (GDP). We can also use the ratio of bank reserve to
bank assets to determine the level of development of the financial market.
Whichever of this ratios is used, the financial depth in Nigeria is still shallow.
When coupled with the high level ofliquidity in the economy, arising partly from
dominance of cash in transactions, it becomes clear the CBN faces a major
challenge.
Since the banking sector consolidation implemented by the CBN, the banking
industry has witnessed keener competition than before and this has led to
introduction of a wide array of financial market instruments. Among the new
instruments are different types of deposit accounts with variable interest rates,
internet banking, the use of automated teller machine (ATM), Master and Visa
Cards of the different banks and, of course, the increase in the number of branches
of the universal banks and microfinance banks. All these are not only to improve
saving, deepen the financial market and reduce transaction time in banks but also
to reduce the incidence of carrying and keeping currency in the pockets for
transactionary purposes. Notwithstanding, shifting away from cash transactions
to reduce currency outside banks remains a major challenge for regulators in the
industry.

The increasing level ofpoverty has not made private saving to grow; the low level
of awareness of the benefits of the various financial instruments arising from low
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literacy level has not helped to popularize the use of these instruments. Moreover,
the skepticism about the security of deposit withdrawal through the ATM has
constrained the widespread use of card-based instrument; and the recent
experience of people who lost their deposits in failed banks and unrecognized
finance houses (wonder banks) have all combined to repress the growth of the
financial markets.
Another challenge for the monetary authorities is that the banks are also not
helping matters in the area of lending. They still behave like commercial banks
whose philosophy remain liquidity and profitability and, thus, have to function in
the short end of the market. In this context, most of the banks prefer to promote
consumption rather than production. They advertise loans and advances for
purchase of imported finished products like computers, air conditioners,
television and other household facilities. Only few of them engage in loan
syndication to provide long-term funds for production and fewer are involved in
promoting the small and medium scale enterprises. There is, thus, little interaction
between the real and monetary sectors of the economy. The challenge here is the
promotion of consumption over production which should be expected to aid
inflationary pressure on the economy and make inflation targeting difficult to
achieve. More importantly, the promotion of consumption of imported durable
goods results in imported inflation. Therefore, the monetary authorities should
encourage the banks through moral suasion to support production in the real
sector of the economy.
Since the beginning of this decade, the capital market seemed to be growing and
providing alternative source of development finance for the economy until
recently when the bears took over. The market capitalization reached the peak of
NI 2.6 trillion in March 2008 and has since plummeted to the depth ofN8.8 trillion
in August 2008. This drawback has implications for the financial depth and by the
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same token will serve as a challenge to successful implementation of inflation
targeting framework for monetary policy.
An important challenge currently faced by some of the developing countries that
have adopted ITF, particularly South Africa, is the supply-side shocks arising
from international oil price increases since 2004 and the current food price
inflation, both of which require continuous revision of assumptions and forecasts
(Mboweni, 2008). These events and the emerging great depression in the world's
largest economies would have negative implications for successful
implementation of inflation targeting framework in developing countries within
the context of the global village.
Some of the above challenges are not insurmountable, more so when the two
major preconditions for successful inflation targeting framework viz considerable
degree of freedom and refrain from targeting the level or path of any other nominal
variable have been met. As stated earlier, the CBN enjoys some high level of
freedom in its operation and had long adopted flexible exchange rate and market
determined interest rates regimes.
The current global financial crisis might stem the outflow of funds by corrupt
politicians who might be afraid of losing their looted funds. They should,
therefore, be encouraged to invest their funds in both money and capital market in
Nigeria with multiplier effects on the economy and, probably, deepening of the
financial market. The CBN and the Stock Exchange, in conjunction with the
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt
Practices Commission (ICPC) may have to pursue their policies that would make
looters to invest in the capital market at home.
It is noteworthy that pursing low inflation objective successfully is not restricted
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to central banks with formal inflation targeting framework. This is the case with
the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States and the European Central Bank,
both of which have not formally adopted ITF but accepted low inflation as part of
the ultimate goal of monetary policy (see Table 1). The imperative oflow inflation
for long-run growth in output make it worthwhile to keep inflation low. A low
inflation rate over time promotes credibility of the monetary authorities, attracts
Table 1: Three Types of Monetary Policy framework

Country
Ultimate Goal

Intermediate
Target
Operational
Target
Monetary
Instrument

Monetary
Targeting
Germany
Inflation

Inflation
Targeting
Canada
Inflation

Money Supply

Inflation Forecast

OMO, Government
Securities
Repo rate, 0 / N

OMO, Government
Securities
Bank Rate, 0 / N

Multiple Targeting
Or US Framework

us
Inflation,
Employment,
Growth
Money Supply
OMO, Government
Securities
Feds Funds Rate,
0/N

Note: Repo = Repurchase market rate, O/N = Interbank overnight rate,
OMO = Open market operation.
Source: Adapted from IMF( 1999) "Transparency and Good Practices for Monetary Policy".

The prospect of successful implementation of ITF in Nigeria is further enhanced
with the low level of inflation that is recorded in recent years, the growing external
reserve and fiscal discipline. However, sustaining and maintaining these trends,
particularly in the area of fiscal discipline, is very important for the project. As a
stop gap to moving into inflation targeting, the country can first sustain the
monetary targeting and when the trend is assured, the CBN can then adopt
inflation targeting as the framework of monetary policy. This was the model
adopted by Thailand.
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The development ofmonetary policy in Thailand has come a long way. Like many
developing countries, Thailand's exchange rate regime, for the large part of four
decades, was the fixed exchange rate. With the economic reforms ofthe 1980s, the
country adopted monetary targeting regime in July 1997 and by May 2000, the
country moved to inflation targeting.
Under the monetary targeting framework, the ultimate goals of monetary policy
were price stability and economic growth. The intermediate targets through
which the ultimate goal are achieved are exchange rate, long-term interest rate,
domestic credit and assets prices via the use of official interest rate, reserve
requirement, open market operations and direct control as the monetary
instruments (see Figure 1). The model was modified on the adoption ofITF (Fig.
2). The strategy is to achieve price stability at low rate and this is done by ex-ante
forecast of the inflation rate for the period or year. The major instrument is open
market operation.
V.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper deals with two current issues of interests to the monetary authority
namely Risk-Based Supervision and Inflation Targeting Framework of monetary
policy. The necessary requirements for the introduction and adoption of the two
frameworks were highlighted. Subsequently, the challenges the monetary
authority would have to grapple with if it is to adopt any or both frameworks was
evaluated.
For the risk-based superv1s1on framework, it was advised that the current
competitive environment, the rapid development of information technology and
globalization of finance make it imperative for the central bank and other
financial sector regulators to take steps to adopt and implement the framework.
This will require some training for some categories of staff of both the regulatory
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authorities and the financial institutions. Fortunately, Nigeria is not the first
country to adopt the framework, thus, the staff to be trained can be sent abroad to
acquaint themselves with the demands ofthe project.
The inflation targeting framework is a desirable goal for monetary policy but the
regulators will have to overcome a number of challenges. These include stability
of macroeconomic policy over time, reduction in the quantum of currency in the
money supply portfolio through education and encouragement of the public to use
near-monies or non-cash financial instruments for transactions, and, improving
the depth of the financial market through, among other issues, growing of the real
sector by the banks. In the interim, the monetary authority might take the route or
model ofThailand.
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Appendix
Figure!: Framework for Conduct of Monetary Policy
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Source: Adapted from Bank of Thailand, Document for Inflation Targeting Seminar, 2000

Fig. 2: Inflation Targeting Framework in Thailand
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